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up, murder rose substantially, but imprisonment
went down (Figure 3). In France (Figure 4), the
number of people in prison per    100 000
population zigzagged because there is a
fundamentally different political culture and
philosophy about crime and punishment. In that
country, you are primarily a citizen. Everybody
celebrates national events, and large numbers of
prisoners are released every time there is a French
presidential inauguration or a significant national
event.
During the period 1950–2000, the incarceration
rates in Denmark, Norway and Sweden were
similar, and the imprisonment rate in Finland
dramatically dropped over the period to a level
similar to that of its neighbours (Figure 5). This is
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If countries can learn from one another, South Africa can learn from the experiences of other countries that
have re-organised their sentencing systems in recent decades. South Africa’s correctional system has many
similarities to America’s – seriously overcrowded prisons, sentences that are too long, stark disparities, and
therefore injustices, in sentences received for comparable crimes. American solutions – mandatory minimums,
prison terms measured in decades not years – have neither reduced crime rates nor made streets safer. Nor
will they in South Africa. Comparisons of countries with very different sentencing policies and punishment
practices – Canada versus the United States, Finland versus the rest of Scandinavia, England versus Scotland –
show that sentencing and punishment have little discernible effect on crime trends and patterns. Crime trends
and patterns in most developed countries move in broad parallel, irrespective of national punishment policies.
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Crime and imprisonment statistics from anumber of First World countries over a 30-year period support Mark Mauer’s (2006)
proposition that ‘crime does not cause
punishment’ – that incarceration rates are a matter
of policy, and do not have significant effects on
levels of crime. 
Over the period 1960–1993, violent crime in the
US went up four to five times and the incarceration
rate went up three to four times, but the murder
rate stayed fairly static (Figure 1). In Germany over
a similar period (1961–1992), violent crime went
up 3.5 times, the murder rate stayed at the same
level, but imprisonment went down in the 1960s
and stayed flat for 30 years (Figure 2). In Finland
over the period 1965–1994, violent crime went
Figure 1: Imprisonment, violent crime and murder rates in the US per 100 000 population 1960–19932
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Figure 2: Imprisonment, violent crime and murder rates in Germany per 100 000 population 1961–1992
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what the Finns wanted. They had been under
Russian domination from the early 1800s to the
mid-1900s, and had similar incarceration rates to
the Soviet Union. By 1950, Finland decided it did
not want to be eastern; it decided to look west
instead, and wanted to demonstrate how
Scandinavian it was by taking a deliberate policy
decision to reduce the rate at which it incarcerated
people. There was an enormous outbreak of crime
in Finland when this decision was taken. 
However, if you look at comparative crime statistics
across the four Nordic countries for the period
1960–2000 (assuming these are actual crime rates –
crime definitions vary from one country to another),
the curves are almost exactly the same.
Figure 3: Imprisonment, violent crime and murder rates in Finland per 100 000 population 1965–1994
Figure 4: Incarceration rates in France per 100 000 population 1965–2005
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Figure 5: Incarceration rates in four Scandinavian countries 1950–2000 per 100 000 population
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Figure 6: Offences against the criminal code in four Scandinavian countries 1960–2000 
per 100 000 population
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The US imprisonment rate has skyrocketed to about
4.5 times the Canadian rate, which has remained at
about 100 per 100 000 since the 1950s (Figure 7).
The homicide rates in the US over 40 years are far
higher than those of Canada (Figure 8). But if one
looks at the relative change in homicide rates in the
US and Canada (with the rates standardised at 1), it
is clear that the trends are very similar (Figure 9). 
Again, this backs up the assertion that countries
choose the rate at which their residents are
incarcerated. France chooses from year to year what
proportion of its people should be in prison. The US
chose to increase its incarceration rate, but this has
not affected its crime levels. The experience of
Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland shows the
level of imprisonment makes no difference to the
Figure 7: Violent crime and imprisonment rates for the US and Canada 1980–2000 per 100 000 population
Figure 8: Homicide rates in the US and Canada 1961–2003 per 100 000 population
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level of crime – the Finns decided to stabilise their
imprisonment rate and steadily drop it to the level
of their neighbours as a matter of policy, but their
crime rate curves were the same as those of their
neighbours. 
Are minimum and mandatory penalties doing the
job? 
The advocates of minimum and mandatory
sentences claim that they act as a deterrent, and that
they promote consistency in sentencing, but this is
not supported by available evidence. Studies show
judges and juries tend to avoid having to impose
minimum/ mandatory sentences, that such penalties
have no deterrent effect (or a temporary one), and
that sentences are not consistently applied. There
are also cases where these sentences have led to
profound injustices. 
In 18th and 19th century England the death penalty
was mandatory for about 150 crimes in the belief
that this would reduce crime. Pick-pocketing was
one such crime, but no deterrent effect was
apparent – rampant pick-pocketing was reported at
public executions of pick-pockets. Anybody found
guilty of the theft of property worth more than £20
had to be executed. This was later reduced to theft
of only £5. In practice, when judges and juries felt
uncomfortable about having to impose such a harsh
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sentence, they worked hard to evade minimum
sentencing by finding thieves guilty of stealing only
£4 and 19 shillings. Some thieves were pardoned. 
The pleading rules for a valid prosecution became
increasingly technical to make it more difficult for
this kind of whole-scale evasion to take place, but
with little effect. The belief that minimum/
mandatory sentencing would promote consistency
in sentencing was also shown to be false. There was
enormous inconsistency in what happened to
individual thieves at that time. Some were
convicted of stealing £4 and 19 shillings, some
were executed, some were convicted and
pardoned, and some convictions were overturned
on technical grounds.
Mandatory penalties proliferated in the US over a
long period of time for such offences as drug
crimes, also motivated by the belief that this would
act as a deterrent. The US experience indicates that
these measures have no deterrent effect, and that
large-scale evasion of having to impose such
penalties has taken place. There have been cases
where offenders have been imprisoned for 20 years
on drug charges in circumstances where judges did
not believe these sentences were appropriate.
Several judges resigned in protest, including two
from the Federal Bench. 
Figure 9: Change in homicide rates in the US and Canada per 100 000 population
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The evasion finding is pretty consistent, as is the
finding that minimum sentencing has no deterrent
effect, or that any short-term deterrent effect tends
to wither away over time. Reducing particular
crimes is a valid public objective, but minimum
sentencing is not the way to achieve this goal.
Sentencing policy: a need for consistency,
accountability and transparency 
There have been five or six ways that countries have
reorganised their sentencing systems over the last 30
years to achieve systems that are more just –
consistent, accountable and transparent. Some
work, some do not. The best evidence points in one
direction for South Africa. 
Finland and Sweden have radically changed their
sentencing laws in the last 30 years. They have
sentencing principles that provide judges with
guidance on most of the questions they are likely to
be faced with, including the weight that should be
accorded to a prior record; the extent to which a
person is dangerous or can be changed through
rehabilitation; and what difference it makes if a
person is not really an adult (in Sweden anyone
below 15 is legally incapable of committing a
crime). Verbal statements of principle seem to
produce a system that is highly consistent and they
provoke stimulating debates about exactly how to
apply a principle in a certain kind of case. In those
countries, sentencing guidelines seem to make a
difference. 
In the UK, and to some extent in Canada and
Australia, high courts may issue guideline
judgments, but the jury is still out on whether this
makes any difference to sentencing practice. There
is no empirical evidence that this has an influence
on what judges actually do in the UK. 
In some US states there are very detailed voluntary
guidelines that tend to indicate sentences for every
crime and every combination of prior record.
Conscientious judges will look at these when
considering a sentence. The evidence is that these
have no demonstrable effect, although a major
exception is in Delaware, where there are only 14
felony court judges, most of whom were involved in
drafting the guidelines. Judges who disagreed with
the guidelines left the bench, and sitting judges
influenced new judges. Presumptive guidelines, as
applied in Minnesota, Washington, and Oregon,
seem to increase the consistency of sentencing in
general, and particularly in relation to race, gender,
and geographical disparities. 
Mandatory guidelines for sentencing have been part
of the US Federal Court system for about 20 years.
For example, robbery would receive more and
more serious penalties if, for instance, there was a
firearm involved, if the firearm was fired, and so on.
The official policy of the US Sentencing
Commission was that judges ought to impose a very
specific sentence. This meant that a number of
potentially mitigating circumstances, such as a
convicted person having family responsibilities,
being a drug user, having a deprived childhood or
making a contribution to the community, were not
ordinarily regarded as factors in sentencing. 
Sentencing became progressively harsher,
frequently driven by the prosecution. The judiciary
resisted this set of guidelines for the entire period
that they were in force, until 2004, when they were
declared unconstitutional. The guidelines are now
voluntary. Judges may impose what they consider to
be an appropriate sentence, provided they give
reasons for their decision.
The Finnish and Swedish systems of sentencing
principles tend to recommend very short periods of
imprisonment – rarely more than a year, and often
only for a week or two. The number of prisoners in
those countries sentenced to more than three years
is a fraction of 1%. The maximum sentence for
most crimes is 14 years. This means the potential
for inconsistency and disparity is very small. 
Those countries have a high-prestige career
judiciary – a cadre of highly talented professionals
with a strong ethos about their duty to exercise
justice. Students who want to be prosecutors or
judges select their direction in law school (although
they may move back and forth between the two
professions). 
The prosecution sees itself as a semi-judicial
institution. The judiciary therefore puts strong
professional and cultural norms into practice to
TONRY
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preserve just sentencing principles. No US state
could adopt Scandinavian principles because the
political character of the US courts is so strong. But
voluntary guidelines in US state courts can make a
huge difference when there is a professional cadre
of prosecutors and judges who share a professional
ethos.
Conclusion
Crime does not cause punishment. There is nothing
inherent in South Africa that suggests its
incarceration rate should be 350–400 people per
100 000. Imprisonment rates are chosen by
politicians, they are not the result of increased
crime. The transitional character of South African
politics makes it different from Sweden or Finland,
but there is no reason to think that it is any different
to any one of the countries where it has been
shown that the level of imprisonment makes no
difference to crime. 
There is no evidence for the claim that mandatory/
minimum sentencing has any impact on consistency
of sentencing or levels of crime. The primary
function of such sentences is for governments to
symbolically say ‘we are doing something about
crime’. This does not seem to fool anybody. The
percentage of people who say they are fearful to go
out at night before and after the imposition of
mandatory sentencing does not seem to change.
The proposal of the South African Law Reform
Commission for a structured approach is probably
the only way to achieve reasonable consistency,
predictability and transparency in sentencing. This
also provides a potential mechanism for holding
judges accountable i.e. to ensure they apply a
sentence appropriate to the offender rather than
reflecting the personal attitudes of the judge. 
It is suggested that South Africa should decide to
reduce imprisonment rates by 50%, persuade
Parliament not to renew the minimum sentencing
legislation, and follow Dirk van Zyl Smit’s (2006)
lead on a structured approach to sentencing.
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